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14 Mar 2001
By:Peggy Prince, Executive Director of Peace Action N.M.
Dr. Beryl Schwartz, educator
Cathie Sullivan, researcher
Dr. Francis Boyle, law professor at Illinois University, author of the 1989 Bioweapons and Anti-Terrorism Act.
Without doubt, accidental or deliberate biological contamination of people or the environment is a serious concern. However, the Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL-3) Bio-Weapons lab proposed for LANL is not only the wrong location, given their scandalous safety and security record, but also the wrong mission for a nuclear weapons research, development and production facility. Unlike the BSL-2 facility license they now hold which only allows them to study dead pathogens of viruses and bacteria, with a BSL-3 facility license they can study and reproduce live „infectious or lethal exotic agents¾. A BSL-3 facility has never been located at a nuclear weapons production lab before. There shouldn¼t be one at LANL now. Let¼s examine why.
Two useful yardsticks exist against which to measure LANL's request for a new bioweapons-capable lab. Since the folks who want to increase work with toxins and disease organisms are managers with roots deep in the nuclear weapons program, we can first look at their performance record in critical areas like worker safety, community safety, and whistleblower protection.
Intimidation of whistleblowers, a cavalier attitude towards worker safety, and inept, often over-budget program management, have characterized LANL from the beginning. For instance, according to the final accident report of April,1996, investigators found that Laboratory managers were at fault in the electrocution of Efren Martinez (Efren jackhammered into a 13,200 volt cable and 4 years later remains in a vegetative state). The work was performed outside the safety rules of an authorized workplan in a rush to beat a deadline and the two Lab managers most directly responsible for this tragedy are both still working at the Lab with promotions and pay raises. The investigators stated that: 'Significant, sitewide, programmatic weaknesses in the Laboratory's safety management program and failure to correct them were the principle causes of the accident.' A follow up report done 2 years later, reported that many electrical safety problems had not been addressed and the Lab had quietly ended many corrective actions before the corrections were completed or verified as effective. In a second example of disregard of worker safety, consider that during the Cerro Grande fire, which burned large sections of potentially contaminated LANL property, firefighters were given no protective gear or instructions for reducing risk of contamination to their families from their work clothes. A third example deals with disregard of community safety. The lab planned open-air testing of detectors using a strain of bacterium Bacillus globigii (Bg) which can be harmful to elderly and infirm persons. The community of White Rock objected to putting children, seniors, and those with impaired immune systems at risk and forced the experiment to stop.
The second useful yardstick with which to judge LANL¼s competency, is the February 2001 report from the Department of Energy's office of Inspector General, an independent auditing agency within the government. This important document is available at http://www.ig.doe.gov/oig_public_documents.htm (Inspection of Department of Energy Activities Involving Biological Select Agents; IG-0492) The report's main finding cites deficiencies in organization, oversight and implementing procedures in the current DOE (and LANL) bioweapons-related program. If these sound like vague criticisms, they are not. They are the concrete failures that, as in Efren's case, increase the risk Lab work poses to its workers and the public.
Specifically, the Inspector General (IG) found that the Albuquerque DOE office did not even know LANL had 'an extensive program' with Anthrax or select agent DNA nor had the Lab's Biological Safety Officer done the required assessment or evaluation of biolab safety.
The report also cited inadequate screening of incoming shipments of biological material at LANL. In one case this resulted in a scientist working with the wrong DNA material for four months before realizing his error-- a potential biological catastrophe if the same thing happened at the proposed new lab with live toxic or disease-causing organisms. Also at LANL, after receiving a shipment in a container with both outer and inner linings crushed , a scientist promptly destroyed the material but the 'responsible facility official' told the inspector there was 'zero risk' and he saw no need for 'special handling procedures'. The Los Alamos Biosafety Officer told the investigator they had no 'hazard control plan' for damaged shipments, a story they later changed after seeing the quote in the IG's draft report.
Unfortunately, this list goes on and on. While at one time accident reports were on LANL¼s website, now they are behind a cyber wall, out of public view. The frequent newspaper reports on nuclear and hazardous materials accidents at LANL are just the tip of the iceberg, since often only diligent reporter investigations unearth pertinent facts that would otherwise be kept from public purview.
The Lab's chronic mismanagement and safety failures should remove it from consideration as a site for a bioweapons-capable facility with the built-in potential for accidents with toxins and disease organisms.
Nationally, there are other serious concerns. The Bush administration has rejected the Comprehensive nuclear Test Ban Treaty, a Treaty that is crucial for further reductions in nuclear weapons and to reducing the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There is serious talk of abandoning the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, as well, in order to pursue the National Missile Defense, a continuation of the fairy story Star Wars debacle which may well end up costing well over $100 Billion. The U.S. has also refused to sign on to the Landmine Treaty which could help save thousands of innocent civilian lives each year.
Later this year there will be a review of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in Geneva. Given the Bush lack of commitment to other important treaties, will the Bush, Helms, Domenici et al regime work to weaken and desiccate that treaty as well? While Bush¼s national security team expresses concern about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. remains the largest purveyor of such weapons over the years, and the team has said little about the ongoing international negotiations to strengthen the BWC. Their silence regarding support for arms control treaties in general is troubling and may be reflective of its attitude toward BWC.
The Department of Energy has traditionally used starry-eyed rhetoric, scare tactics, and slick propaganda to try to woo and confuse the public. In this instance, they are trying to push the BSL-3 facility at LANL without being willing to submit the plan for the facility, using live „infectious or lethal exotic agents¾, to a full Environmental Impact Statement. However, it¼s not necessary to scratch our heads and assume that the government wouldn¼t lie to us. Use the logic of your own experience. If it looks like a snake and sounds like a snake... well you know the rest.
The legitimate work of bio-threat reduction must find a home where managers respect safety, respect whistleblowers, have real oversight and demand that established procedures are followed. LANL doesn't even come close to filling the bill.
LANL should not add more toxic, select DNA or disease agent work to the already unsafe, poorly managed nuclear weapons program. New Mexico deserves better than to be the nation's center for both nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction.
Demand that the Department of Energy¼s National Nuclear Security Agency, which would be in charge of the BSL-3 facility, be required to conduct a full and fair Environmental Impact Statement. Better yet, just say åno¼.
According to University of Illinois law professor, Dr. Francis Boyle, author of the 1989 Bioweapons and Anti-Terrorism Act which outlaws the manufacture of biological weapons, „This creates prima facie problems of compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. Why locate a bio-weapons lab at a facility whose primary mission is development and production of offensive nuclear weapons? You can imagine the way other countries will view it: We say to them, don¼t do it, meanwhile our own people are putting dual-use research into a known weapons facility.¾
Peace Action New Mexico is a statewide affiliate of Peace Action, the nation¼s largest grassroots peace and social justice organization. Peace Action N.M. can be contacted at 505.989.4812
TO COMMENT ON THE BSL-3 BIO-WEAPONS FACILITY AT LANL, CALL OR WRITE:
Rep. Tom Udall - phone: 202-225-6190/505-984-8950 ; email: tom.udall@mail.house.gov
Sen. Jeff Bingaman - phone 202-224-5521/505-988-6647; email: senator_bingaman@bingaman.senate.gov
Elizabeth Withers, N.E.P.A. Compliance officer, 528 35th St, Los Alamos, N.M. 87544 or call:667-8690
Cory Cruz, DOE/LANL Area Office, 528 35th St. Los Alamos, N.M. 87544 or call:667-5105