|
|
|
|
Published by the Federation of American Scientists Fund No.
48 (August 2002)
On January 30, 2002, the Chilean government and Lockheed Martin wrapped up
five years of negotiations with the announcement that Chile had agreed to
purchase ten F-16 fighter jets and related equipment for $636 million. The
deal marked the end of a two-decade-old unilateral U.S. moratorium on the
transfer of major weapons systems to Latin America.
Not four months later, U.S. government officials declared that they would permit the sale to Brazil of yet another advanced weapon: the AIM-120 advanced medium range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM). Consistent with U.S. policy to refrain from introducing new weapons technology into a region, the AMRAAMs were off limits to Latin American militaries until Peru admitted in September 2001 that it possesses the Russian equivalent, the R-77 medium-range air-to-air missiles (AA-12 Adder). By making these decisions the U.S. government showed its disregard for the risk of a regional arms build-up and the diversion of scarce resources from pressing social needs that this new military spending will entail.
This latest chapter in the dispiriting history of advanced weapons proliferation begins with President Clinton's August 1997 decision to lift the Carter administration ban on advanced weapons sales to Latin America. Pressure from the arms industry - salivating over a market that promised $7 billion in future combat aircraft orders alone - undoubtedly influenced Clinton to lift the ban (See ASM 35). Regardless of the reasons, the administration's decision paved the way for the spread of advanced American technology, not only to Chile but to the rest of Latin America as well.
It was not until four years later that a deal actually appeared imminent, and Santiago quickly came under heavy fire both at home and abroad, largely because new fighter jets were considered an unnecessary expense for a developing nation. Chilean NGOs, legislators and even the President's own political party condemned the proposed sale. Several regional powers, Peru being the most vocal, also called on Chile to forgo the purchase, claiming that the advanced aircraft would upset the regional military balance. In September 2001, Peruvian Defense Minister David Waisman issued a dramatic offer to both refrain from upgrading its MiG fleet and to give up their controversial Adder missiles if Chile would agree not to buy the fighters. Chilean President Lagos summarily dismissed the offer.
Still feeling the pinch of the Argentine economic meltdown, Chileans continued to condemn the sale right up until the government reached a deal with Lockheed in late January. Lockheed's dollar-for-dollar offset package, which includes a General Electric Plant that will provide technical assistance and maintenance for the GE motors installed in the F-16s, undoubtedly made the sale more palatable.
Having inked the Chilean deal, the world's number one arms exporting nation has turned its attention to Brazil, where Lockheed is trying to land a $900 million contract for jet fighters. The U.S. government believes that Brasilia's distrust of the U.S. as a consistent weapons supplier, its air force's clear preference for the Russian Su-35, and the partnership between Embraer - Brazil's leading aerospace industry and the likely beneficiary of any direct offsets package - and the French company Dassault puts the Americans at a distinct disadvantage. For these reasons, the Defense Department felt the need to preemptively pad the sale with some high tech extras, taking the unusual step of sending a congressional notification for 12 F-16s and 48 AMRAAMs to Congress before they were even selected by Brazil. Government officials working on the sale claimed that Lockheed would already be out of the running had the Defense Department not authorized the inclusion of the AMRAAMs in the weapons package.
Explaining the Sales
Few arms sales are more deserving of skeptical inquiry than the two above. Neither Chile nor Brazil face any serious short-term external security threats, and even credible theoretical threats are difficult to identify. Brazil has had to deal with spillover from Colombia's civil war, but containing errant rebels does not require Beyond Visual Range (BVR) air-to-air missiles. The same goes for Chile. Chile's neighbors lack both the intent and the capacity to pose a serious military threat, according to Jane's Information Group. Both governments would be better served by investing the millions set aside for new war planes in combating a more immediate threat to their peoples' health and well-being: poverty and the risk of fallout from Argentina's economic crisis.
So why the sales? While U.S. defense industry lobbying undoubtedly played a key role, several additional factors facilitated the deals. The first is the Pinochet-era "Copper Law." While the Chilean air force may have sought to acquire new planes anyway, the "Copper Law" - which requires that 10% of the revenue from Chile's National Copper Corporation be used to buy weapons - makes a certain level of spending on arms a fait accompli and therefore easier to justify.
The second is Peru's mid-1990s defense spending spree. A mini arms race sparked by border tensions between Peru and Ecuador prompted former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori to purchase 18 MiG-29S/UB, 18 Sukhoi Su-25A/UB fighters and advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles in 1997, the missiles now being used to justify hawking its own AMRAAMs in Latin America. U.S. officials insist that they have done everything they could (including offering Lima a lot of money) to convince the Peruvians to "do the right thing" by giving up their Adders. Since there is no public record of the negotiations, it is difficult to evaluate this claim. Regardless, Peru's arms control efforts, which include a proposed ban on beyond visual range air-to-air missiles in Latin America, are bearing fruit and may prompt them to sell their Adders back to Russia. Even if they do, say U.S. officials, "the toothpaste is out of the tube," and the offer to sell AMRAAMs to Brazil still stands.
The U.S. policy of playing "follow the leader" - exercising restraint only until other countries do otherwise - is a recipe for failure, and for endless proliferation. The success of the Carter moratorium - in the mid-1990s, per capita spending on defense in Latin America was the lowest in the world - is proof positive that a determined U.S. effort to limit the spread and accumulation of advanced weaponry can make a big difference. Building on this accomplishment requires that the current administration find the political will to lead rather than follow.
